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ABSTRACT
After the presidential election of July 2012, won by the PRI, the pros-
pects for achieving meaningful changes in Mexico were not promising. 
The more pluralistic and competitive political environment developed 
in recent years had made increasingly dificult the creation of legisla-
tive majorities needed to produce major reforms. On the other hand, 
there was still unease and mistrust among political actors. The govern-
ment and the opposition parties negotiated the Pact for Mexico, a 
multiple-issue agreement which provided the basis for pushing for an 
ambitious reform agenda, including a political-electoral component. 
The article theorizes that given the existence of formal constraints, po-
litical actors seek and build alternative mechanisms to provide viability 
and functional capability to the political system. 
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I. FRAMING THE ISSUE
After the presidential election of July 2012, won by Enrique Peña Nieto 
of the Revolutionary Institutional Party, (PRI, for its acronym in Spanish), 
the prospects for achieving major changes in the Mexican institutional 
framework were not promising. The more pluralistic and competitive 
political environment developed in recent years had made increas-
ingly dificult the creation of the congressional majorities needed to 
produce major reforms. On the other hand, despite numerous politi-
cal-electoral reforms, there was still unease and mistrust among politi-
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cal actors, with both electoral processes and institu-
tions being questioned.
Mexico´s democratization process has focused on 
a series of successive changes to electoral laws.1 In 
the 1990s, and independent electoral authority, the 
Federal Electoral Institute (IFE, for its acronym in Span-
ish) was created. Later reforms strengthened IFE´s in-
dependence and its ability to supervise and manage 
electoral processes, reinforced the role of the elec-
toral judicial tribunal (TEPJF, for its acronym in Span-
ish) and allowed a response to increased demands 
of a more plural political environment. After 65 years 
of dominance, in 1994 the PRI lost qualiied majority 
in the Chamber of Deputies, and in 1997, simple ma-
jority. In 2000, it lost the presidency to the National 
Action Party, (PAN, for its acronym in Spanish), which 
would win it again in a close election in 2006. After-
wards, the impartiality and effectiveness of electoral 
institutions and rules were questioned, and a major 
reform took place in 2007-2008, focusing on achiev-
ing equality in media access. Political parties were 
forbidden to buy media coverage, now adminis-
tered by IFE (using government time slots, charged as 
taxes to media companies).
During the 2012 presidential election, criticisms and 
dissatisfaction were voiced again, mostly on the lack 
of control on the low of resources and overspending 
in political campaigns, particularly by the presidential 
candidate of the PRI. The PAN and the Democratic 
Revolutionary Party, (PRD, for its acronym in Spanish) 
also complained that PRI governors (governing most 
Mexican states), increasingly empowered by receiv-
ing federal oil revenues and acting as local chief-
tains, controlled local legislatures and electoral au-
thorities, and decidedly intervened and favored their 
party.2 IFE´s performance was questioned, and it was 
argued that it had lost its credibility as an impartial 
and professional institution. 
Democratization in Mexico turned divided govern-
ment into a real possibility, and brought the risk of 
stalemate. During the PRI hegemonic regime concen-
tration of power in the presidency and its control of 
the party meant automatic legislative majorities, with 
no need for negotiation or the creation of coalitions. 
1 Electoral reforms 
have taken place 
in 1977, 1986, 1990, 
1993, 1994, 1996, 
2007-2008 and 2013-
2014. See Becerra, 
Salazar & Wolden-
berg (2000), Merino 
(2003) and Wolden-
berg (2012).
2 Since the early 
2000´s, state govern-
ments increasingly 
received resourc-
es from the federal 
government, as a 
share of oil reve-
nues. With little over-
view, they used the 
resources discretion-
ally. Governors from 
all three major par-
ties created an in-
formal organization, 
the National Con-
ference of Gover-
nors (CONAGO, for 
is acronym in Span-
ish), to discuss issues 
of common inter-
est and give state-
ments. Through fed-
eral legislators from 
their home state, 
many attempted 
and succeeded in 
exercising inluence 
over the federal 
budgetary process.
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More pluralism has produced a more active and as-
sertive Congress, and winning coalitions were now 
needed to be skillfully crafted (Rosell, 2000, ch. 1). 
Theorists of democracy have stated the balance 
between the principles of representation and gov-
ernability, between more diverse and plural govern-
ment components and more government eficacy. 
They are both important to construct democratic le-
gitimacy, since plurality provides moral foundations, 
but a lack of response to society´s needs and prob-
lems could undermine such legitimacy. Depending 
on a speciic situation and context, the balance can 
lean towards one or the other principle, in order to 
provide continuity and functionality to the political 
system.3 After increasing movement towards more 
pluralism, the need to achieve important reforms in 
Mexico seemed to call for the strengthening of gov-
ernability. A presidential regime with three major po-
litical parties (PAN-PRI-PRD), it turns very dificult to 
build winning coalitions, able to approve major legis-
lative changes. 
This article theorizes that although formal institutional 
arrangements constraint the functional capability of 
a political system, political actors seek and develop 
alternative mechanisms to improve its performance. 
A more pluralistic Congress in a presidential system, 
with three predominant political parties, increases 
the possibility of confrontation with the Executive 
and reach stalemate. Furthermore, after a process 
of strengthening representation and democratiza-
tion, rising expectations for an effective government, 
capable of improving general economic and social 
welfare, mount pressure to obtain results. The dificulty 
to change the framework or follow time-consuming 
and uncertain established paths work as incentives 
for political elites to shorten and make more eficient 
communication channels and implementation mea-
sures. 
Following theoretical reasoning, major political 
players construct semi-formal arrangements for ne-
gotiating and improving chances of policy success. 
Government leadership identiies key actors and their 
interests, as well as the major issues to be addressed. 
In a multi-level and multi-issue negotiation process, 
3. On this classic 
debate, see Sartori 
(1997b, ch. 1) and 
Nohlen (1984).
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every party involved should make some gains, ac-
cording to its relative leverage position. The negoti-
ators develop a commitment to achieve and imple-
ment agreements, even at risk of alienating part of 
their own constituencies. This allows the political sys-
tem to work outside and alongside the institutional 
framework, dramatically increasing the chances of 
moving forward in a reform agenda. 
II. PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS
Attempts to facilitate the creation of majorities and 
enhance governability have had scan results. In De-
cember 2009, President Felipe Calderón from PAN 
made a proposal for a political and electoral reform 
that included second ballot for presidential election, 
legislative and mayoral reelection, reducing the size 
of Congress, raising the threshold for political parties, 
and preferred presidential initiatives. It also contem-
plated measures to favor democratic representation 
and participation, such as independent candidates, 
referendum, and citizen initiative. Although many of 
these components had been part of several previous 
proposals, the novelty was the way to combine them.
President Calderón had achieved only very limit-
ed iscal and energy reforms, and his political party 
faced unfavorable results in the 2009 midterm elec-
tion. Thus, he sought to deal irst with a political reform, 
in order to strengthen the Executive and make more 
accountable and eficient the legislative process. Af-
ter a long debate and the introduction of compet-
ing proposals, a diminished political reform was ap-
proved in August 2012. It only included presidential 
initiative, independent candidates, citizen initiative 
and popular consultation. The formation of coalition 
governments, a theme introduced in the Senate, was 
also excluded.
In July 2012, Enrique Peña Nieto won the Mexican 
presidency with 38.21% of the vote, against 31.59% 
of Andrés Manuel López Obrador of the PRD, and 
25.41% of Joseina Vásquez Mota, of the PAN. Un-
like the 2006 election, when Calderón won a close 
victory over López Obrador (35.89% versus 35.33%), 
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Peña Nieto had a considerable advantage. Despite 
accusations of spending money during his campaign 
well above legal limits, his victory was not effectively 
contested. 
After Calderon´s election, López Obrador along 
with the PRD had organized a “civic resistance” cam-
paign, refusing to accept the oficial result, arguing 
inequalities during the campaign, particularly in me-
dia coverage. He declared himself the “legitimate 
President” of the country, but his leadership and tac-
tics within his own party began to be questioned and 
challenged. Even so, the possibility of an alliance with 
the PAN, Calderon´s party, became highly improba-
ble. The new federal government, unable to ind sup-
port in the PRD, could only turn to the PRI in order to 
create legislative coalitions large enough to achieve 
major reforms, since many required a qualiied major-
ity in Congress. 
The PRI, still bafled by its second presidential de-
feat, found itself as the key player, with the largest 
contingent in the Chamber of Deputies and the sec-
ond in the Senate. It became an unwilling partner, 
refusing to grant signiicant gains to the Executive. 
As mentioned earlier, Calderón had only limited suc-
cess on two key items in his agenda, iscal and ener-
gy reform. In the political arena, the PRD demanded 
changes in electoral laws and the Federal Electoral 
Institute, which resulted in the prohibition of buying 
media exposure by political parties, requiring IFE to 
assign it, and the removal and replacement of IFE´s 
directing body, the General Council. 
López Obrador would again be presidential can-
didate in the 2012 election, but as mentioned ear-
lier, this time is foul claim was less appealing and 
more dificult to argue. A more moderate faction of 
the PRD, labeled New Left (Nueva Izquierda), grad-
ually took control of the majority of the party struc-
ture.4 López Obrador, still with considerable backing 
but increasingly becoming more distant, would 
eventually leave the PRD and found a new party, 
National Renovation Movement, (MORENA, for its ac-
ronym in Spanish). 
4. Jesús Zambrano, 
member of Nueva 
Izquierda, became 
president of the PRD 
in 2011. Other lead-
ers of this faction 
include Jesús Orte-
ga and Guadalupe 
Acosta Naranjo, 
former presidents of 
the PRD, and Carlos 
Navarrete, elected 
president in 2014.
140
Miguel A. Valverde
III. THE SEARCH FOR AN AGREEMENT
The new PRD leadership was willing to portray itself as 
a constructive and collaborative option, and some 
of its members approached president-elect Peña 
Nieto´s transition team, seeking to build an effective 
communication channel (Hernández, 2012). They 
got a positive response. Peña Nieto was a pragmatic 
politician, eager to obtain support for his ambitious 
government agenda. He saw an opportunity to cre-
ate an alliance with opposition political parties, with 
speciic commitments by all parties involved. The PRI 
had the largest legislative group in both chambers of 
Congress, and could achieve simple majority with his 
political ally, the Green Party, (PVEM, for its acronym 
in Spanish). But many reforms required constitutional 
changes, and thus a qualiied majority. Furthermore, 
wider coalitions were needed to provide legitimacy 
and reach to any reforms.
The PAN leadership was also invited to join the 
conversation. In the presidential election, its candi-
date Joseina Vázquez Mota inished in third place. 
This was a major disappointment for the party, after 
a campaign that seemed to lack proper coordina-
tion, with confusing political messages, and even a 
distant relationship with the president and his group. 
Vázquez Mota was not Calderon´s favorite choice 
for presidential candidate, and the PAN leader, Gus-
tavo Madero, had to defeat a strong challenger sup-
ported by the Executive. Madero was still struggling 
to achieve effective control of the party structure, 
and being approached by the president-elect to 
participate in high-level negotiations seemed useful 
to strengthen his position. 
Peña Nieto hoped to give his presidency a strong 
start-up, capitalizing on an initial agreement that 
could provide congressional support. Negotiations 
for what was labeled Pact for Mexico (Pacto por 
México) were initially very discrete, with only a few in-
dividuals involved. But eventually information leaked, 
and voices of discontent emerged in both PRD and 
PAN, arguing a too close relationship with the newly 
elected government. The president-elect wanted to 
141
The craftsmanship of politics: 
negotiating the 2014 political-electoral reform in Mexico
announce the pact before taking ofice, but it had to 
be postponed for a few days, in order to allow PAN 
and PRD leadership more time to address criticisms. It 
was inally signed on November 28, three days before 
Peña Nieto´s inauguration.
To move forward with his agenda, Peña Nieto had 
irst to promote changes within his own party. The PRI 
statutes included opposition to value added taxes in 
food and medicines, as well as privatization in the en-
ergy sector, particularly in the oil industry. The struc-
ture and rules of the party, with strong centralized 
leadership control and incentives for discipline for ca-
reer advancement, allowed Peña Nieto to change 
these stands, in preparation for possible reforms. 
The PRD, on the other hand, had a long tradition 
of factionalism. Founded as an aggregation of leftist 
parties and dissidents from the PRI, it oficially recog-
nizes the existence of “tribes” (tribus) or groups that 
gather around political leaders that control votes 
and party and government positions.5 As mentioned 
before, the group that took the party leadership 
was moderate and willing to work with the new gov-
ernment, but had more dificulty to gather support. 
The PAN also presented divisions, but without oficial 
recognition, and more oriented towards individual 
party member participation in internal debate and 
competition. The so-called “traditional” party mem-
bership disliked getting too close to a priista govern-
ment, and the calderonista group was struggling to 
preserve its inluence, so PAN leadership had also to 
deal with questioning and dissent in its cooperation 
strategy with the new government (Nuñez & Gómez, 
2012).6 
The Pact for Mexico set an ambitious agenda for 
the transformation of the country, promoting reforms 
in areas such as the energy sector (including oil, a 
long-standing nationalist stronghold), iscal policy, 
telecommunications, the inancial sector, the crimi-
nal code and education. The newly elected govern-
ment followed a bold negotiation strategy, pushing 
for profound changers and incorporating concerns 
and priorities of the PAN and PRD leaderships. By ne-
gotiating in multiple topics and addressing demands 
on several issues, President Peña Nieto´s close group 
5 On the origins, 
structure and func-
tioning of the PRD, 
see Cadena Roa 
& López Leyva 
(Comps). (2013).
6 The calderonista 
group was headed 
by senators Ernes-
to Cordero, Javier 
Lozano, and Luisa 
María Calderón, 
sister of the former 
president.
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was able to build a written agreement that stated 
105 speciic commitments, signed by his government 
and the major opposition parties. Thus, this “semi-for-
mal” coalition, a result of able political craftsman-
ship, paved the ground for the intense legislative and 
political activity that followed.
 The Pact included commitments 89 and 90, which 
dealt with electoral and political reform. Both PAN 
and PRD were concerned with issues like the enforce-
ment of campaign spending controls. The PRD also 
wanted political reform in its stronghold, the Federal 
District (which includes Mexico City) to turn it into a 
state, and the PAN asked for the creation of a nation-
al electoral authority, overseeing both federal and lo-
cal elections. As mentioned before, after the PRI lost 
the presidency, its governors became autonomous 
powerful igures, beneiting from oil revenue resourc-
es provided by the federal government. The PAN ar-
gued that many PRI governors controlled their state 
legislatures and local electoral authorities, resulting in 
uneven conditions for electoral competition.
IV. THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS
The early legislative approval of the education and 
telecommunications reforms were presented as im-
portant successes of the Peña Nieto administration. 
This raised criticism within opposition parties, accus-
ing their leaderships of providing support and getting 
nothing in return. The Ruling Council (Consejo Rector, 
which included the leaders of PAN, PRD, PRI and gov-
ernment oficials), established to preside and over-
see the Pact, was denounced for assuming legisla-
tive functions, reaching agreements that should be 
discussed and debated in Congress. Madero faced 
reelection as president of the PAN, and the PRD also 
had an upcoming election to renew its leadership, 
and participation in the Pact would became a cam-
paign issue. The leaders of both PAN and PRD were 
accused of being “too close” to the Peña Nieto Ad-
ministration. Despite being questioned, participation 
in the Pact strengthened their position within their 
own parties. Later on, for the irst time ever, the PRD 
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was able to negotiate presiding 
over both chambers of Congress.
The leader of the PAN Senators, 
former presidential pre-candi-
date and head of the calderonis-
ta group Ernesto Cordero, openly 
challenged Madero. Along with 
a group of PAN and PRD Sena-
tors, he introduced a proposal 
for a major electoral and politi-
cal reform, including far-reach-
ing changes that would basical-
ly result in a semi-parliamentary 
system. After several calls for dis-
cipline and then threats, Madero 
removed Cordero from senate 
leadership, and later managed to 
win reelection. The PRD´s New Left 
group resisted detractors and had 
to postpone internal elections, 
but would also keep its presiden-
cy and main positions. 
The iscal reform was important 
for the federal government, since 
public inances were highly de-
pendent on income from taxes to 
PEMEX, (for its acronym in Spanish) 
the state oil company. The Peña 
Nieto administration wanted to 
lessen this dependence, and 
also allow PEMEX to have more 
resources for investment in ex-
ploration and oil production. The 
government worked on a propos-
al that included tax increases for 
middle and high income contrib-
utors, as well as new taxes and 
limit iscal credits for large compa-
nies. However, it did not contem-
plate applying the value-added 
tax to food and medicines, a very 
sensitive political issue (although 
no longer a banner for the PRI), 
which constituted a critical stand 
for the PRD. The administration 
had the approval and support of 
the PRD, but the PAN denounced 
the agreement, seen as harmful 
to its middle-class voter constitu-
ency, and refused to endorse the 
bill. 
The energy reform was also a 
priority for the Peña Nieto admin-
istration, since it hoped that the 
opening to private local and inter-
national investment would boost 
the sector, in particular the oil in-
dustry, and drive overall econom-
ic growth. Nevertheless, the PRD 
strongly opposed any measures 
to increase private participation, 
so the government´s position was 
much closer to the PAN. But the 
panistas were resentful after be-
ing left out in the iscal reform, 
and denounced that during the 
local elections in Veracruz in July 
2013, the PRI governor had built 
an “electoral network” that used 
social assistance programs and 
provided unlawful resources and 
support to his party, reinforcing 
the argument of a collusion be-
tween local electoral authorities 
and state governments (Reforma, 
2012). 
The PAN leadership threatened 
to abandon the Pact, but decid-
ed to say and demand that only 
after a political-electoral reform 
had been approved, they would 
negotiate an energy proposal 
with the federal administration. 
The government accepted and 
negotiations continued. PAN Pres-
ident Madero wanted to focus on 
electoral issues, arguing the lack 
of time for completing a more 
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comprehensive agreement that 
could apply for the 2015 elec-
tions. But PAN legislators insisted 
on a wider reform, including in-
stitutional changes, and forced 
Madero to comply. Both PAN and 
PRD leaderships introduced po-
litical-electoral reform proposals, 
along with the previous senatorial 
initiative (supported by groups of 
PAN and PRD senators). The Peña 
Nieto administration and the PRI 
decided not to present their own, 
and the Ruling Council of the Pact 
for Mexico announced that ne-
gotiations would take place using 
the three existing ones (Reforma, 
2013).
The main demand of PAN was 
the creation of the National Elec-
toral Institute, INE, which would 
take the place of IFE and be in 
charge of organizing all local and 
federal elections. It was expected 
that this new entity would break 
the governor´s control of state 
electoral organisms, since local 
electoral counselors would be 
named and supervised by the INE, 
and would contribute to reduce 
costs by using more eficiently 
the available resources and cen-
tralizing spending controls. Critics 
(including many academics, IFE 
electoral counselors, governors 
and state electoral counselors) ar-
gued that the new scheme would 
damage federalism, ignore the 
uniqueness of local electoral pro-
cesses, imply a costly transition, 
and produce no signiicant sav-
ings (Michel, 2013; Ibarra & Guer-
rero, 2013). PAN negotiators, how-
ever, stood irmly and prevailed. 
Other central points in the dis-
cussion were campaign spending 
limits and controls, causes for elec-
tion annulment, legislative and 
municipal reelection, threshold for 
political parties, and the forma-
tion of coalition governments. The 
PRI and the government refused 
to consider second ballot for 
presidential election and a new 
law on government publicity and 
propaganda. The PAN, PRI and 
the government went along with 
the negotiations, and although 
the PRD participated, its request 
for political reform in the Federal 
District was sidelined and left for a 
later review. 
Talks between PAN and the 
federal government on energy 
reform had also continued. Nev-
ertheless, when the political-elec-
toral reform seemed to drag in 
local legislatures controlled by 
the PRI (a simple majority of state 
congresses was needed for its i-
nal approval, and then signature 
of the federal Executive), the PAN 
threatened again to abandon 
the table. The PRI leadership had 
to declare that its local legislators 
were committed to its approval, 
the reform moved on, and nego-
tiations on energy continued.
Meanwhile, the PRD denounced 
that the PAN and the Peña Nieto 
administration were exchanging 
the political for the energy reform. 
The energy proposal brought 
close the positions of PAN and the 
government, allowing expansion 
of private investment in the sector 
(as noted earlier, Peña Nieto had 
the PRI modify favorably its posi-
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tion on the subject). For the PRD it was a non-com-
promise issue, and it was left out of the talks. The PRD 
leadership announced its oficial withdrawal from the 
Pact for Mexico, effectively terminating its existence. 
During the negotiation of the reforms, the feder-
al government was accused of “buying” legislative 
votes. Political parties in Congress receive resources 
for legislative activities, which are used discretionally 
and with scant accountability. An increase in these 
resources, extra payments for “legislative perfor-
mance”, as well as federal allowances for speciic 
projects to be chosen by the legislator in his or her 
district or state, raised concerns about the issue, al-
though no investigation has proved these allegations 
(Salazar, 2014; Herrera & Guerrero, 2015). 
V. THE NEW RULES
The political-electoral reform was signed by Presi-
dent Peña Nieto in January 2014, and in the following 
May a new General Law on Electoral Institutions and 
Procedures (Ley General de Instituciones y Proced-
imientos Electorales), applying for both federal and 
local levels, was issued. Other new ordinances were 
the General Law on Political Parties (Ley General de 
Partidos Políticos) and the General Law on Elector-
al Felony Matters (Ley General en Materia de Delitos 
Electorales), both also published in May, the Federal 
Law on Popular Consultation (Ley Federal de Consul-
ta Popular), issued in March, and modiications to the 
existing General Law on the System of Impugnation 
Means in Electoral Matters (Ley General del Sistema 
de Medios de Impugnación en Materia Electoral), 
also in May. The new framework includes changes re-
lated to institutional, representation and governabili-
ty issues. Some of the major points in each theme are 
discussed in the following section.
V.I. INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
The creation of the National Electoral Institute meant 
that all national and local elections were under its 
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jurisdiction, although local electoral authorities were 
preserved as a result of a compromise with the PRI. 
Nevertheless, local electoral counselors were now 
to be appointed by INE, not by state congresses or 
other provisions, and arguably away from governor´s 
control. The conformation of INE´s directive body, the 
General Council, was a result of intense negotiations 
among PRI, PAN and PRD. 
After a selection process that included examina-
tion by an outside committee (formed mostly by 
non-partisan members from academia), the par-
ties supported speciic proiles and candidates. The 
General Council named local counselors, also after 
a selection process including testing and interviews, 
and also choosing from the inalists from parties´ pro-
posals.7 In local electoral tribunals, judges are now 
named by the Senate, instead of state legislatures 
and the governor, also attempting to provide them 
with more leeway from the local executive. 
The INE assumed most functions in the general or-
ganization of elections, has now the faculty to attract 
the overall local electoral process, can remove local 
electoral counselors, and can choose to delegate 
certain provisions, such as political parties and candi-
dates spending overseeing and controls. This institu-
tional design gives great leverage and control to the 
central authority, but it also allows its discretional use 
and has built-in the potential for conlict.8 
A commission was created inside INE to supervise 
and control spending by political parties and can-
didates, which would closely work together with 
the existing technical Fiscal Unit (Unidad de Fiscal-
ización). This unit was harshly criticized by both PAN 
and PRD for its reports on allegations of vote buying 
and overspending by PRI candidates, which denied 
any wrongdoing. Both the commission and the unit 
would now be responsible for receiving and review-
ing inancial reports of every party and candidate in 
every election, a dramatic increase in workload from 
previous years.
The reports would have to be revised much faster 
and eficiently, since overspending became a cause 
for election annulment (ive percent over the autho-
rized limit). As mentioned before, this task could be 
7 The General Coun-
cil of IFE had 9 mem-
bers, with the INE 
it was expanded 
to 11. The IFE func-
tioned with 8 mem-
bers since February 
2013, when one 
counselor resigned, 
and with 4 from No-
vember 2013 to April 
2014, when PAN 
and PRD in Congress 
refused to name 
their replacements 
until the creation of 
the new INE. Local 
counselors (mem-
bers of the Public Lo-
cal Electoral Organ-
isms, Organismos 
Públicos Locales 
Electorales, OPLES, 
generically known 
as such, but that 
conserved their pre-
vious name in each 
state) were appoint-
ed in July 2014 only 
for the 17 states that 
would have local 
elections in 2015.
8 On the use and 
implications of insti-
tutional design, see 
Lijphart & Waisman 
(Eds.). (2002) and 
Horowitz (2002).
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delegated to local authorities, however, it will prob-
ably be centralized given the mandate to improve 
control over campaign inances. Other causes for 
annulment are using money coming from illicit sourc-
es, taking advantage of diverted public resources, 
and buying media coverage. When the difference 
between the irst and second place is less than ive 
percent, these causes will be considered determi-
nant in the result of an election. 
Although one of the main arguments for the cre-
ation of INE was saving resources by centralizing and 
making more eficient management and spend-
ing, it will be dificult to do so. Since the 2007-2008 
reform, money allocated for political parties and its 
campaigns is calculated according to the number 
of registered voters and the minimum salary. New 
and expanded faculties and the need to develop 
more capacities have INE asking for more resources, 
not less. Local authorities continue to exist and cost 
money, and now all its counselors receive the same 
salary (an increase in most cases) and use the same 
formula to allocate resources for all local elections 
to political parties (which also meant an increase in 
most cases). 
V.II. REPRESENTATION
Consecutive reelection in Congress had been op-
posed by PRI, on grounds that it favored the rotation 
of political membership and that its implementation 
could erode party discipline.9 Arguments in favor in-
clude making lawmakers more accountable, giving 
constituency means to approve or disapprove its 
performance, professionalization of legislative work 
(more experienced members), and creating a mutu-
al trust relationship among representatives that can 
allow giving in today in an issue, in exchange for sup-
port in the future (Jacobson, 1992, ch. 5). The PAN 
and PRD pressed on the matter, and the PRI inally 
accepted. Senators and Deputies can be reelected 
9 On the effects of 
reelection on party 
discipline, see Sartori 
(1997a, ch. 3).
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for immediate periods, one for the irst and two for 
the second, for up to twelve years.10
Nevertheless, PRI´s fear of “runaway candidates” 
that could switch parties or run as independents if 
they lose internal nomination, took to the provision 
that reelection only applies with the same party, and 
if the candidate wants to run by a different party or 
as an independent, he or she must resign to its origi-
nal political party before the irst half of the legislative 
period. Political parties retained control over the dis-
tribution of campaign resources, and a centralized 
structure of power remains in Congress, were par-
ty leaders and their negotiation arena, the Political 
Coordination Board (Junta de Coordinación Políti-
ca) controls resources and committee assignments 
(Rosell, 2000, ch. 5). Immediate reelection for munic-
ipal governments, which had also been opposed by 
the PRI, was also introduced for a second period. The 
PRI irst negotiated that every state Congress would 
decide on the issue, but legislators from both PAN 
and PRD insisted and were able to make it mandato-
ry in the Constitution for all states. 
The new legislation states that half the candidates 
for Congress of every party must now be women, 
and in the party lists of proportional representation 
candidates, women and men must be intercalated. 
All election formulas (proprietor and substitute can-
didates) must be of the same gender. These are im-
portant and decisive afirmative action measures.
Independent candidacies, introduced by the 2012 
electoral reform, were also regulated. In order to run 
for ofice, they must constitute a civil association that 
will receive the same iscal treatment that a political 
party. They will get public resources and have access 
to media, all together as if they were a newly regis-
tered political party (then divided amongst them),11 
and can also have private funding. Depending on 
the election, they can have representatives in coun-
cils of electoral authorities at all levels. To be presi-
dential candidate, they must gather signatures of 
one percent of the electoral registration list, in at least 
seventeen states. For senatorial and deputy relative 
10 The Mexican Sen-
ate has 128 mem-
bers, two elected 
by formula in each 
state by the relative 
majority or winner 
take all principle, 
one from the irst mi-
nority party in each 
state, and 32 by 
proportional repre-
sentation from a na-
tional list. The Cham-
ber of Deputies has 
500 members, 300 
elected by relative 
majority in their dis-
tricts, and 200 by 
proportional repre-
sentation divided in 
5 regional lists. On 
the issue of improv-
ing representation 
through electoral re-
form, see Dummett 
(2004).
11 Available resour 
ces for political par-
ties during elections 
(calculated in ref-
erence to the voter 
registration list, lista 
nominal de elec-
tores) are divided 
as follows: 70% ac-
cording to the vote 
obtained in the past 
election for depu-
ties, and 30% equally 
amongst all parties. 
Newly registered par-
ties have only access 
to the later.
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majority candidacies, they must convene signatures 
of two percent of the state or district electoral regis-
tration list.
Although independent candidacies allow direct 
representation, without the intermediation of political 
parties, obtaining the required signatures is a daunt-
ing task for most citizens, who need to build a mobi-
lization structure. The resources they can gather and 
use are relatively scarce compared to the support an 
“oficial” party candidate can receive, so expecta-
tions about this igure should be very modest. Even if 
elected, independent lawmakers could be isolated, 
with little chance of effective impact on legislation, 
without the support of a party group and probably 
divided amongst them. 
V.III. GOVERNABILITY
The electoral reform allowed the creation of partial 
electoral coalitions, which meant that political par-
ties should support at least 50 percent of common 
candidates in a given election, under the same polit-
ical platform. It also contemplates the lexible coali-
tion, with at least 25 percent of common candidates 
under the same platform. These measures are sup-
posed to facilitate agreements for political parties, 
encourage a wider support for candidates, and fa-
vor the formation of legislative coalitions. 
The Law on Political Parties stated irst that votes 
for a coalition candidate in a ballot would count 
only as one, and not for each allied political par-
ty marked in it. But the PRD and the small political 
parties (Green-Ecological Party of Mexico, Partido 
Verde Ecologista de Mexico; Workers´ Party, Partido 
del Trabajo; Citizens´ Movement Party, Movimiento 
Ciudadano; and New Alliance Party, Partido Nue-
va Alianza) were opposed, and took their claim to 
the Supreme Court, which invalidated the provision 
(Fuentes, 2014). This improved their chances of man-
aging enough support to preserve their oficial regis-
try, and of gaining proportional representation seats. 
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The legal framework established that no political 
party could have more than 8 percent of overrep-
resentation, that is, the number of seats in relation to 
its percentage of the vote, not only in the Chamber 
of Deputies (as previously stated), but also in all state 
legislatures. This principle limits the possibility of larger 
parties, most likely the PRI, to have access to more 
proportional representation seats and achieve legis-
lative majority.12 It favors pluralism and the principle 
of representation, now uniformly across the country. 
The law also rises the threshold from 2 to 3 percent 
of the vote for political parties, to obtain and main-
tain their registry. It is argued that a too low thresh-
old could imply the inclusion of irrelevant parties, but 
one too high might leave out signiicant options and 
inhibit the birth of new ones (Sartori, 2005, pp. 105-
109). There´s the viewpoint that fewer political par-
ties make negotiations easier and agreements more 
feasible. Only the Green-Ecological Party, PVEM, has 
had the suficient size and position to determine the 
formation of a winning legislative coalition. There´s 
also the public perception that small parties have 
scarce representation, cost much taxpayers money, 
and some are managed as private businesses or per-
sonal political platforms. Thus, the measure is aimed 
at reducing the number of political parties, and argu-
ably improving governability. 
Popular consultation was introduced with the 2012 
reform, and regulated with the new law on the sub-
ject. It supposedly provides a decision device for ma-
jor issues, although running the risk of being overused 
or increase confrontation (Powell, 2000, ch. 3-4). The 
consultation issue can be proposed by the Execu-
tive, one of the chambers of Congress (with 33 per-
cent of senators or deputies), or a group of citizens 
(with 2 percent of the voter registration list). It must 
be approved by the Supreme Court, and voted by 
both chambers Congress. Matters of human rights, 
electoral rules, State income and expenses, national 
security and armed forces, and foundations of the 
republic (federal, representative democracy) are to 
be excluded. Its result will become mandatory if the 
overall turnout is at least 40 percent of the voter reg-
istration list. The consultation takes place the same 
12 On the subject 
see Shugart & Carey 
(1992, ch. 9).
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day of the general election, substantially improving 
the chances of enough participation to become 
mandatory. 
Considered a useful mechanism for breaking po-
litical stagnation or stalemate, popular consultation 
is thus an instrument for effective government. How-
ever, Mexican political parties used it as a mean for 
campaigning. During 2014, the three major parties 
requested INE (by law in charge of organizing them) 
to include consultations in the June 2015 midterm 
elections, the PRD on revoking the energy reform, the 
PAN on minimum salary raise, and the PRI on elimi-
nating proportional representation seats. This provid-
ed them with extensive media exposure, very useful 
in a non-electoral year. It was dubious that any of 
them would be approved by the Supreme Court, 
which actually rejected them. But the gain was con-
siderable, and the incentive is attractive even if they 
don´t fulill the legal requirements. Furthermore, if one 
major party proposes a consultation, the others will 
very likely follow with one of their own. 
The political-electoral reform contemplates the pos-
sibility of a coalition government, when the president 
invites one or more political parties different from its 
own. This allows a wider support base in the Legisla-
tive, in exchange for coordinating public policies and 
positions in the Executive branch. It provides a formal 
basis for an agreement that could construct a work-
ing and enduring majority in Congress, something a 
single party has not been able to achieve since 1997, 
when the PRI lost simple majority in the Chamber of 
Deputies. If an agreement is reached, the Senate 
would ratify cabinet appointments. This widens the 
options if the president´s party doesn´t gain majority 
in Congress. The Executive can now choose between 
a minority government and intense legislative negoti-
ation to have his proposals approved, or negotiating 
irst a coalition that would assure legislative support, 
although by sharing the conformation of his govern-
ment agenda. It provides an interesting and useful 
mechanism to improve governability. 
The main criticism to this type of arrangements is 
the dificulty to achieve consistency in the design 
and implementation of the public agenda, and that 
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a cabinet composed by members of different politi-
cal parties could compromise the uniied command 
structure of the Executive.13 Although the agreement 
should specify the causes for its abandonment, it´s 
hard to foresee its duration. The end of the coalition 
does not imply the fall of the government and a call 
for new elections as in a parliamentary system, but it 
can have a high political cost, hinder future cooper-
ation, and disrupt the continuity of public policies. 
The creation of coalition governments was put for-
ward in similar terms during the negotiations for the 
2012 political-electoral reform, by the then leader of 
the Senate, Manlio Fabio Beltrones of the PRI, sup-
ported by PAN and PRD. Nevertheless, Beltrones was 
a contender against then governor Peña Nieto for 
the PRI presidential candidacy, and its acceptance 
could have been viewed as an achievement for the 
senator.14 The governor´s advocates in Congress re-
fused to include the measure then, but it was pro-
posed again by the PAN and PRD and included in 
the 2014 reform. The Pact for México was actually an 
attempt to construct a coalition among major po-
litical parties and the government, to provide some 
certainty and continuity to a very ambitious reform 
agenda. A provision to formalize such arrangements 
seemed appropriate. 
CONCLUSIONS
The Pact for México was an interesting experiment, 
crafted with a pragmatic sense of opportunity, were 
every political actor involved was willing to give and 
take. The close negotiation among a compact group 
made possible an agreement, offering the govern-
ment a chance to push for an ambitious reform pro-
gram. It provided opposition party leaders and their 
groups with a tool to inluence the public agenda, 
claim credit in some issues, but distance themselves 
from some others. After successfully confronting and 
taming discontent within their own organizations, 
they were able to effectively strengthen their position 
and party control, and deliver the legislative coali-
13 Shugart and Car-
ey argue that leg-
islative ratiication 
of the cabinet is an 
effective parliamen-
tary measure to im-
prove governability, 
allowing participa-
tion of both branch-
es in the conforma-
tion of government. 
On the other hand, 
Pasquino questions 
the uniied function-
ing of “compound 
cabinets”, although 
referring to semi-
presidential regimes. 
See Shugart & Car-
ey (1992, ch. 6) and 
Pasquino (2007).
14 Beltrones was lat-
er elected deputy 
and became leader 
of the PRI group in 
the 2012-2015 legis-
lature. 
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tions needed to construct the majorities that made 
reforms possible. It can actually be viewed as a pre-
view, of how a formal government coalition in the 
Mexican presidential regime could work. 
The political-electoral reform was negotiated as a 
component of a larger agreement, which sought to 
also address social and economic issues, and thus 
arguably improving the overall quality of the Mexi-
can democracy.15 The multiple level channels of ex-
change made possible the inclusion of some mea-
sures long discussed but discarded in previous reform 
attempts, such as reelection and coalition govern-
ments. It created a new institution, INE, which cen-
tralizes the organization and supervision of all federal 
and local elections, an immense and complex task. 
The reform introduces igures that seem to facilitate 
the creation of legislative majorities, and thus favor 
governability. They include limbering electoral coa-
litions, a higher threshold, decision through popular 
consultation, and the possibility of formal coalition 
governments. Nevertheless, it also incorporates some 
that seek to assert representation. Reelection is sup-
posed to make lawmakers more accountable and 
responsive to their constituencies, and less disciplined 
to political party structures. But electoral and con-
gressional rules put a very high price on rebellion, and 
provide effective means for party predominance. In-
dependent candidates, allegedly a voice for unsat-
isied citizens, also have to fulil tough requirements 
and overcome major obstacles to have a chance to 
be elected. 
The permanence and extension to all state legisla-
tures of the limit to overrepresentation diminishes the 
prospects for an outright majority by a single party, 
implying a clear recognition of a more plural political 
environment. However, the overall combination of 
these elements seems to lean toward generally im-
proving governability, but they will have to be tried 
out and probably modiied, or even abandoned 
along the way. The 2014 political-electoral reform 
was the result of an innovative negotiating arena 
and process in Mexican politics, and a further step in 
the country´s democratic advancement. 
15 The concept of 
quality of democra-
cy and its compo-
nents is discussed in 
Diamond & Morlino 
(Eds.). (2005).
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As the theoretical framework 
indicated, non-established, semi- 
formal negotiation arrangements 
where critical for success. Presi-
dent Calderon´s 2012 electoral re-
form was very limited, after follow-
ing established institutional routes 
that led to strong positioning on 
issues and even confrontation. 
The new presidential administra-
tion and the leadership of major 
opposition political parties joined 
in an early negotiation process, 
which provided the government 
with legitimacy and momentum, 
and the party heads with con-
trol of their party structures and 
chances of advancing their own 
political careers. Multi-level nego-
tiation made possible the energy 
reform, pushed mainly by PAN, a 
iscal reform in terms sought by 
PRD, and telecommunications 
and education reforms support-
ed by PRI. Components pursued 
by all parties where included and 
incorporated in a new electoral 
reform. Interests where identiied 
and attended, major issues and 
concerns addressed, and relative 
leverage was exercised. The po-
litical system worked its way and 
was able to break an impasse 
through alternative channels, 
making policy reform possible. 
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